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WHEN WINDSOR ISN’T ENOUGH: WHY THE
COURT MUST CLARIFY EQUAL
PROTECTION ANALYSIS FOR SEXUAL
ORIENTATION CLASSIFICATIONS
Stacey L. Sobel*
This Article asserts that the “liberty interest” and “animus” analy-
ses used by the United States Supreme Court in sexual orientation-re-
lated cases provide limited guidance to lower courts in conducting
federal Equal Protection Clause analysis.  As a result, lower courts face
significant hurdles in analyzing these claims because the Court has not
yet determined what standard of review should be applied.  Until it does
so, courts will continue to apply different levels of review and the results
of discrimination claims will be pre-determined by the standard of re-
view in the jurisdiction.
Recent cases recognizing marriage equality may resolve a host of
legal issues faced by same-sex couples, but sexual minorities can also
face other legal issues.  Consequently, traditional equal protection anal-
ysis is still necessary for sexual minorities.  This Article addresses the
impact this lack of guidance has had on lower courts and how it may
affect claims of governmental sexual orientation discrimination in the
future.
Part I reviews traditional equal protection and due process juris-
prudence.  Part II examines the currently available analyses for sexual
orientation discrimination by looking at the hybrid liberty interest, ani-
mus analysis, and traditional equal protection review.  Part III evaluates
what standards of review state supreme courts and federal courts have
applied in sexual orientation-related cases to analyze how courts are
utilizing standards of review and how United States Supreme Court
precedents have impacted those courts’ decisions.  The last Part dis-
cusses why traditional equal protection review is still necessary and how
the Court should approach equal protection analysis for sexual orienta-
tion-based classifications in the future.
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tanda, Susan Keller, Paula Manning, Todd Brower, John Culhane, Gwyndolyn Leachman, and
Stephen Chavez for their support.  My research assistants Michael Jeandron, Vanessa Klass,
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The Article concludes that a Court ruling that sexual orientation
classifications merit heightened scrutiny analysis would not be breaking
new ground but would be more of a restatement or a different applica-
tion of what the Court and some lower courts are already doing in sexual
orientation-related cases.  The Court’s clarification that heightened
scrutiny should be applied to sexual orientation-related classifications in
equal protection cases would provide fairness, predictability, and protec-
tion for lesbian, gay, and bisexual people.
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INTRODUCTION
It seems that every day another court decision relating to the marital
rights of same-sex1 couples is in the news.2  The number of pending
cases has grown considerably since the United States Supreme Court
1 This Article focuses on legal issues related to sexual orientation-related classifications.
The common initialism for the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) community will
be used to discuss legal issues that are relevant to the broader sexual minority community.
Issues related to LGBT people may involve matters related to both sexual orientation and
gender identity, and other issues may be more relevant to only one of these groups.  The Court,
however, has only examined issues related to sexual orientation in its decisions.  These cases
form the underlying analysis of this Article.
2 See generally Stacey L. Sobel, Culture Shifting at Warp Speed: How the Law, Public
Engagement and Will & Grace Led to Social Change for LGBT People, 88 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
(forthcoming May 2015).
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handed down the United States v. Windsor decision in 2013.3  The
Court’s precedents, however, provide limited guidance to lower courts in
conducting federal Equal Protection Clause4 analysis in sexual orienta-
tion-related cases.5  As a result, lower courts must read Windsor’s “tea
leaves”6 to determine which standard of review should be applied.
The Court’s sexual orientation-related decisions have primarily re-
lied upon “liberty interest” and “animus” analyses to determine the con-
stitutionality of claims.  This is illustrated by a trilogy of the Court’s
sexual orientation-related decisions in Romer, Lawrence, and Windsor.7
Lower courts still face significant hurdles in analyzing federal Equal Pro-
tection Clause claims related to sexual orientation classifications because
the Supreme Court has not yet determined what standard of review
should be applied.  This lack of guidance has created constitutional dis-
parities because different jurisdictions are using a variety of standards of
review, and sexual orientation-related rights have become in part depen-
dent on how stringent of a test a particular jurisdiction applies to these
claims.8
Marriage equality may resolve a host of legal issues faced by same-
sex couples, but sexual minorities may face many other legal issues that
have not been addressed by the Court.9  While these marriage victories
are important, they provide little clarity for courts addressing non-marital
legal claims.  It has also been argued that the marriage-related cases are
more appropriately analyzed as sex-based discrimination, rather than
sexual orientation discrimination, and therefore have limited value in
other sexual orientation contexts.10  Additionally, the focus on marriage
litigation can minimize other legal issues, such as employment or hous-
ing11 discrimination, that may be faced by less “mainstream” portions of
the LGBT community such as the working poor and LGBT people of
3 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); see discussion infra Part III.B.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
5 This Article will discuss “sexual orientation-related” issues.  This phrase broadly de-
scribes legal matters where a person’s sexual orientation is relevant to their claim even if it is
not in fact the basis of the legal claim.  For instance, this Article would describe a claim
brought by a same-sex couple alleging an unconstitutional infringement of the their fundamen-
tal right to marry as a “sexual orientation-related” claim even though sexual orientation dis-
crimination is not the basis of the claim or the ultimate court decision.
6 Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 425 (M.D. Pa. 2014).
7 See 133 S. Ct. at 2693–96; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620, 632–36 (1996).
8 See discussion infra Part III.
9 See discussion infra Part IV.
10 See Andrew Koppelman, Beyond Levels of Scrutiny: Windsor and “Bare Desire to
Harm,” 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 3–14 (2014).
11 During hearings on the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012), inval-
idated by Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675; 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012), a United States senator stated
that employers and landlords should have the right to discriminate on the basis of sexual
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color.12  As a result, traditional equal protection analysis is still necessary
for sexual minorities.
The Court has instead created the liberty interest analysis, a melding
of substantive due process and equal protection doctrines,13 that is uti-
lized to provide equal access to a person’s “liberty.”14  The analytical
shift towards the new hybrid liberty analysis can be interpreted as a
movement away from the Court’s privacy precedents and traditional due
process analysis of fundamental rights and “‘deeply rooted tradi-
tions.’”15  In fact, the hybrid liberty analysis does not rely on traditional
doctrinal analysis of either clause.
The Court’s animus analysis asserts that it is constitutionally imper-
missible for the government to target a group because of moral disap-
proval16 or a “‘bare . . . desire to harm [the] . . . group’”17 and
consequently removes the need to conduct a traditional equal protection
analysis.  The Windsor Court further explained that laws motivated by
improper animus require “careful consideration.”18  This indicates that
the appropriate analysis in animus cases is a more stringent form of re-
view than traditional rational basis.  Some have suggested, however, that
a finding of animus is akin to a “silver bullet” that, once detected, elimi-
nates any purportedly legitimate justifications of the legislation.19
By relying on these nontraditional analyses, the Court sidestepped
traditional analytical frameworks to reach its conclusions in the trilogy of
cases.  The use of these nontraditional analyses, however, does not elimi-
nate the need for additional direction on the appropriate standard of re-
orientation. See The Defense of Marriage Act: Hearing on S. 1740 Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 9, 12–13 (1996) (statement of Sen. Don Nickles).
12 See Russell K. Robinson, Marriage Equality and Postracialism, 61 UCLA L. REV.
1010, 1038–39 (2014).
13 See Lawrence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” that Dare Not
Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1897–98 (2004).
14 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013).
15 Daniel J. Crooks III, Toward “Liberty”: How the Marriage of Substantive Due Pro-
cess and Equal Protection in Lawrence and Windsor Sets the Stage for the Inevitable Loving
of Our Time, 8 CHARLESTON L. REV. 223, 228–29 (2014) (citations omitted).
16 See Jeremiah A. Ho, Weather Permitting: Incrementalism, Animus, and the Art of
Forecasting Marriage Equality After U.S. v. Windsor, 62 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 55–62 (2014);
see also Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products: Equal Protection from Animus, 2013 SUP. CT.
REV. 183, 188–90 (stating that the animus principle is uncontroversial and courts are compe-
tent to police unconstitutional animus).
17 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,
534–35 (1973)).
18 See id. (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)).
19 Susannah W. Pollvogt, Windsor, Animus, and the Future of Marriage Equality, 113
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 204, 213 (2013); see also Carpenter, supra note 16, at 204 (citing R
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 148
(2001) (referring to animus as a “trump card”)).
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view for sexual orientation-based claims under the Equal Protection
Clause in other types of cases.20
This need was identified three decades ago, when Justice Brennan
stated, “Whether constitutional rights are infringed in sexual preference
cases, and whether some compelling state interest can be advanced to
permit their infringement, are important questions that this Court has
never addressed, and which have left lower courts in some disarray.”21
The Court’s reliance on nontraditional analyses since that time has cre-
ated a number of problems.
For example, the Court has applied the hybrid liberty analysis to
limited substantive issues such as private, consensual sexual activity22
and the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).23  As a result, lower
courts can easily compartmentalize the liberty analysis’s relevance by
applying it only to those legal issues and fact patterns the Court has ad-
dressed.24  A court confronted with marriage litigation is more likely to
engage in the hybrid analysis after Windsor because it was a marriage-
related case than, for example, a court examining a claim of education
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.  It would be relatively
easy for a court to distinguish its set of facts or claims from prior Court
liberty interest decisions that related solely to sodomy statutes or
DOMA.25
The Court’s impermissible animus analysis is also limited.  The ani-
mus analysis only is applied where there is actual or implied evidence of
the animus, such as the enactment history and text of the law at issue in
Windsor.26  This type of evidence, however, may not be available in
other challenges to governmental actions.  Now that the Court has used
20 This is not the only instance where the Court’s lack of guidance has led different
courts to apply varying tests. See, e.g., Stacey L. Sobel, The Tsunami of Legal Uncertainty:
What’s a Court to Do Post-McDonald, 21 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 489 (2012) (analyzing the
impact of the Court’s lack of guidance on Second Amendment cases and recommending a
standard of review).
21 Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1015–16 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
22 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
23 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696 (2013).
24 It can also be argued that the liberty analysis may be limited in its application to other
substantive due process issues if the Court defaults to a more traditional analysis in future
cases.  The Court, for example, chose a more traditional analytical approach in Gonzales v.
Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007), where the Court upheld abortion regulations, than it did previ-
ously in Lawrence, which utilized a liberty analysis. See Steven G. Calabresi, Substantive Due
Process After Gonzales v. Carhart, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1517, 1519–20 (2008) (stating that the
Court’s Gonzales analysis indicates a return to the more traditional analysis in Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)).
25 See Catherine Jean Archibald, Is Full Marriage Equality for Same-Sex Couples Next?
The Immediate and Future Impact of the Supreme Court’s Decision in United States v. Wind-
sor, 48 VAL. U. L. REV. 695, 712–13 (2014).
26 133 S. Ct at 2693.
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the animus analysis more regularly, legislatures may become more so-
phisticated at hiding unconstitutional biases in legislation by carefully
drafting laws and avoiding legislative histories that demonstrate animus.
Animus analysis is also not likely to be as useful in cases where the
plaintiff is alleging a more individualized claim of discrimination against
a government actor.  It can, for example, be difficult to gather evidence
demonstrating animus by a governmental employee who fails to hire or
promote a person based on sexual orientation discrimination.
Some observers may believe that engaging in the examination and
application of specific standards of review for sexual orientation classifi-
cations is not necessary because virtually all post-Windsor constitutional
marriage equality challenges have resulted in invalidating governmental
limitations.27  This belief is shortsighted.  The excitement and analyses
generated by these court cases are only part of the constitutional legal
picture for sexual minorities.
Despite significant increased support for sexual orientation-related
issues,28 discrimination against and opposition toward sexual minorities
has not been eradicated.  There are no federal laws prohibiting discrimi-
nation on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity,29 and a ma-
jority of states still do not offer any antidiscrimination protections for
LGBT people.30  The limited statutory coverage of sexual orientation
discrimination creates a real need for constitutional equal protection for
LGBT people.  This concern is magnified when courts have interpreted
27 The only decisions upholding a state marriage equality ban post-Windsor occurred
more than a year after the Supreme Court decision. See DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th
Cir. 2014), cert. granted sub nom. Obergefell v. Hodges, 83 U.S.L.W. 3315 (Jan. 16, 2015)
(No. 14-571) (preparing to review 6th Circuit decisions upholding Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio,
and Tennessee marriage limitations); Robicheaux v. Caldwell, 2 F. Supp. 3d 910, 927–28
(E.D. La. 2014); Borman v. Pyles-Borman, No. 2014-CV-36, 2014 WL 4251133 (Tenn. Cir.
Ct. Aug. 5, 2014) (same-sex couple married in Iowa divorce request denied due to Tennessee’s
marriage ban for same-sex couples).  More than two dozen marriage equality cases post-Wind-
sor have resulted in the invalidation of a state marriage equality ban. See Lyle Denniston,
String of Same-Sex Marriage Rulings Broken, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 11, 2014, 3:14 PM), http://
www.scotusblog.com/2014/08/string-of-same-sex-marriage-rulings-broken/; see also discus-
sion infra Part III.B (reviewing sexual orientation-related court cases post-Windsor).
28 For example, polling in 2014 revealed that support for marriage equality laws in-
creased to 55%.  When Gallup first asked Americans about marriage equality in 1996, 68%
were opposed to recognizing marriage between two men or two women and only 27% sup-
ported it.  Justin McCarthy, Same-Sex Marriage Support Reaches New High at 55%, GALLUP
(May 21, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/169640/sex-marriage-support-reaches-new-
high.aspx.
29 President Obama has signed executive orders prohibiting employment discrimination
on the bases of sexual orientation and gender identity and prohibiting federal contractors from
discriminating against their LGBT employees. See Exec. Order No. 13,672, 79 Fed. Reg.
42,971 (July 21, 2014).
30 See State Nondiscrimination Laws in the U.S., NAT’L GAY AND LESBIAN TASKFORCE,
http://thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/issue_maps/non_discrimination_6_13_color.pdf (last
updated June 21, 2013).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\24-3\CJP303.txt unknown Seq: 7 30-MAR-15 11:41
2015] WHEN WINDSOR ISN’T ENOUGH 499
sexual orientation-related precedents in dramatically different ways that
result in inconsistent standards of review and results.31
Justice Kennedy authored the majority decisions in the Court’s tril-
ogy of cases relating to sexual orientation.32  These cases provide the
nontraditional liberty and animus approaches courts may use in deter-
mining whether the federal constitutional rights of sexual minorities have
been violated, yet none of them provide a definitive test for lower courts
to use in examining federal equal protection claims.  This Article ad-
dresses the impact this lack of guidance has had on lower courts and how
it may affect litigation resulting from governmental sexual orientation
discrimination in the future.
This Article first reviews traditional equal protection and due pro-
cess jurisprudence.  Part II examines the currently available analyses for
sexual orientation discrimination by looking at the hybrid liberty interest,
animus analysis, and traditional equal protection review.  The Article’s
third Part evaluates what standards of review state supreme courts and
federal courts have applied in sexual orientation-related cases to analyze
how courts are utilizing standards of review and how Supreme Court
precedents have impacted those courts’ decisions.  The last Part dis-
cusses why traditional equal protection review is still necessary and how
the Court should approach equal protection analysis for sexual orienta-
tion-based classifications.
The Article concludes that a Court ruling that sexual orientation
classifications merit heightened scrutiny analysis would not be breaking
new ground but would be more of a restatement or a different application
of what the Court has already been doing in sexual orientation-related
cases.  The Court’s clarification that heightened scrutiny should be ap-
plied to sexual orientation classifications in equal protection cases would
provide fairness, predictability, and protection for lesbian, gay, and bi-
sexual people.
I. TRADITIONAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The Supreme Court has developed a number of traditional jurispru-
dential analyses to determine whether a governmental classification or
infringement of a right meets the corresponding constitutional require-
ments.  Most constitutional challenges to sexual orientation-related laws
focus on equal protection and due process claims.  Which standard of
review a court uses to analyze the constitutionality of a law typically
determines the outcome.  As a result, the Court’s failure to articulate
31 See, e.g., Lawrence C. Levine, Justice Kennedy’s “Gay Agenda”: Romer, Lawrence,
and the Struggle for Marriage Equality, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 2 (2013).
32 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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which level of review to use for sexual orientation-related cases means
that a person’s constitutional rights will be dependent on the jurisdiction
hearing the case.
A. Equal Protection
In Equal Protection Clause33 cases, the Supreme Court has devel-
oped different levels of review based on the classification of the affected
group.  Statutes that discriminate on the basis of race or national origin34
are presumptively unconstitutional under strict scrutiny analysis, and in
the equal protection context, the test is typically described as being
“‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact.”35  The government must prove that
its action is “narrowly tailored” to “achieve a compelling governmental
interest,”36 and it is no more restrictive than necessary to achieve the
purported governmental interest.37  The test is extremely difficult to
meet, and consequently, most laws analyzed under this standard of re-
view are invalidated.
Gender38 and illegitimacy39 classifications are reviewed under inter-
mediate scrutiny, and a valid restriction “must serve important govern-
mental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of
those objectives.”40  The burden of proof is placed on the government in
intermediate scrutiny cases, and while it is not as fatal as strict scrutiny,
it is still “demanding.”41  In gender discrimination cases, the Court has
indicated the relative strength of scrutiny by stating that there must be an
“‘exceedingly persuasive justification’” for the discrimination in order
for the law to be upheld.42  This can be seen as shifting intermediate
scrutiny analysis more towards strict scrutiny rather than the easily at-
tained rational basis test discussed below.
33 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); Bolling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (noting that the federal government is similarly limited by
the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause).
34 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (asserting
that race-based affirmative action programs must meet strict scrutiny); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466
U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (asserting that racial classifications are suspect and “subject to the most
exacting scrutiny”).
35 Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
36 E.g., Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 82 (1997).
37 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPALS AND POLICIES 687 (Vicki
Been et al. eds., 4th ed. 2011).
38 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
39 See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (citations omitted).
40 Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
41 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (citing Miss. Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).
42 Id.
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In order to determine the appropriate standard of review for a classi-
fication, the Court stated in Carolene Products that a heightened level of
scrutiny would be appropriate when there is “prejudice against discrete
and insular minorities . . . which tends seriously to curtail the operation
of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minori-
ties.”43  After Carolene Products, the Court has looked at the following
factors in a variety of cases to determine if a classification should be
analyzed under a heightened level of review: a history of invidious dis-
crimination;44 an immutable characteristic;45 assumptions about a
group’s ability to contribute to society;46 deep-seated prejudice;47 and
political powerlessness.48
All other classifications allegedly fall under rational basis review.
A regulation will be held valid under rational basis review if it bears a
“rational relationship” to a “legitimate governmental purpose.”49  Unlike
the more rigorous levels of scrutiny discussed above, rational basis test
challenges typically fail due to the relative ease of finding a legitimate
governmental interest.  Courts have held that any legitimate interest
would suffice to meet the rational basis test, even if it were not an actual
interest of the government when the law was passed.50  Additionally,
under the rational basis test, courts are generally highly deferential to the
government.51
There are a limited number of cases where the Court appeared to
apply the rational basis test or did not state what test it used and struck
down the challenged provision under the Equal Protection Clause.  These
43 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
44 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531–32 (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684
(1973) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion)) (history of sex discrimination).
45 See Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) (noting close relatives “do not exhibit
obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group”).
46 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (finding
that classifications may “reflect . . . a view that those in the burdened class are not as worthy or
deserving”).
47 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982).
48 See, e.g., City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445 (analyzing whether the intellectually dis-
abled are politically powerless); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216 n.14 (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)).
49 E.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993).
50 “A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be
conceived to justify it.”  McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961) (citations omitted).
51 See FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (stating that it never
requires the legislature to articulate why it enacted legislation).
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cases52 suggest that the Court applied a more stringent version of the
rational basis test, often referred to as “rational basis with bite.”53
It is important to note that the last time the Court granted heightened
scrutiny to a new classification was 1977,54 long before any of our cur-
rent Justices were sitting on the Supreme Court.55  One reason the Court
may be reluctant to expand the list of classifications that receive a height-
ened standard of review is pluralism anxiety, where “‘insular and dis-
crete’ minorities” are found at “every turn in the road.”56  This concern
was addressed in Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., where the
Court declined to extend heightened scrutiny to a group of people with
intellectual disabilities due to the difficulty in distinguishing between the
variety of groups with immutable characteristics.57  Even if a classifica-
tion is  accorded heightened scrutiny, the analysis will be dropped to the
more deferential rational basis standard if the law is facially neutral and
lacks a discriminatory intent.58
Even though the Court has failed to extend heightened scrutiny to
any new classifications in almost forty years, this reluctance may be tem-
pered by the fact that it has applied rational basis with bite in a variety of
cases59 such as Cleburne, Moreno, and Romer.60  The impact of these
cases has been limited, however, as courts have generally applied tradi-
tional rational basis to the classes in the cases above in other contexts.61
This has changed somewhat with the application of animus and rational
basis with bite to cases related to sexual orientation classifications.62
52 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632–36 (1996) (invalidating state constitu-
tional amendment preventing state and local laws that prohibited discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation); City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448 (affirming invalidation of city ordinance
requiring special permit for group home for intellectually disabled); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973) (invalidating Food Stamp Act provision which deemed
households containing unrelated individuals ineligible for the program).
53 E.g., Nan D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1129 (2004);
accord Gunther, supra note 35, at 21; R. Randall Kelso, Considerations of Legislative Fit R
Under Equal Protection, Substantive Due Process, and Free Speech Doctrine: Separating
Questions of Advancement, Relationship and Burden, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 1279, 1283 (1994).
54 See, e.g., Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 757
(2011) (citing Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 766–76 (1977) (applying heightened scrutiny
to non-marital children)).
55 As a result, the Court’s current generation has not seriously engaged in the political
process theory that the Burger Court utilized in its equal protection analysis.  William D.
Araiza, After the Tiers: Windsor, Congressional Power to Enforce Equal Protection, and the
Challenge of Pointillist Constitutionalism, 94 B.U. L. REV. 367, 369 (2014).
56 Yoshino, supra note 54, at 758 (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 657 R
(1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
57 See 473 U.S. at 445–46.
58 See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979).
59 Yoshino, supra note 54 at 759. R
60 See cases cited supra note 52. R
61 See Yoshino, supra note 54, at 761 (citations omitted). R
62 See discussion infra Part III.
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While the Court has engaged in a traditional equal protection analy-
sis for a variety of classifications, it still has not undergone this exercise
for sexual orientation classifications.  Until it does so, courts will be left
on their own to determine how stringent of a test to apply in these cases.
B. Due Process
“Equal Protection and Due Process analyses exist in somewhat par-
allel universes”63 with legal challenges often involving claims under both
constitutional provisions.64  Substantive due process decisions typically
break standards of review into the strict scrutiny65 and rational basis cat-
egories.66  If the infringement of a fundamental right is at issue, a court
will typically apply strict scrutiny.67  And if it is not a fundamental right,
courts will analyze the claim under traditional rational basis review.
There is great debate among scholars and judges regarding what
actually constitutes a fundamental right.  Some suggest it is limited to the
intent of the framers68 or the Constitution’s text,69 including the Four-
teenth Amendment’s guarantee to protect life, liberty,70 and property.
Others look at it more expansively to include rights that are “deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,”71 and some expand the
framework to include any rights within the “penumbras”72 of the Consti-
tution or included under the Ninth Amendment.73  The Court has relied
on the broader views of substantive due process in order to declare a
fundamental right to privacy.74
63 Sobel, supra note 20, at 496. R
64 See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2660 (2013).
65 Due process strict scrutiny is not always applied in the same way in all due process
cases or in comparison to equal protection strict scrutiny analysis. See Gunther, supra note 35, R
at 8.
66 See Sobel, supra note 20, at 496. R
67 See id. at 496–98.
68 E.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L.
REV. 204, 204 (1980).
69 See generally ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRE-
TATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012).
70 The constitutional protection of liberty has been interpreted to extend beyond physical
restraint. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997) (citing Collins v. City of
Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)).
71 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977); LAURENCE H. TRIBE &
MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 68 (1991).
72 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 516–22 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
73 Id.
74 See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 681–82, 685 (1977) (al-
lowing only licensed pharmacists to provide contraceptives to individuals over sixteen violates
privacy right); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (prohibiting unmarried individu-
als from using contraceptives violates privacy right).
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Like equal protection rational basis analysis, the due process ra-
tional basis test “is typically easy to achieve but also has occasional
bite.”75  A number of Supreme Court cases have used this more search-
ing form of rational basis,76 which is recognized by scholars as a differ-
ent form of rational basis analysis.77  Moreover, in every case where
courts have applied rigorous rational basis, the added rigor has proven
fatal to the challenged law.78
The test that is ultimately selected to analyze an equal protection or
due process case will most likely be determinative of the outcome in that
case.79  As a result, the Court’s failure to determine what test should be
used for governmental sexual orientation classifications is of critical im-
portance to the constitutional rights at stake for sexual minorities.  The
next Part reviews the trilogy of Supreme Court cases and the constitu-
tional analyses available to sexual orientation-related constitutional
claims.
II. SUPREME COURT ANALYSES RELATED TO
SEXUAL ORIENTATION CASES
Three of the Supreme Court’s most recent decisions related to the
rights of sexual minorities80 may have represented victories for equality
advocates, but they also left open a number of analytical issues.  While it
is clear that the Court was not applying traditional equal protection or
due process analyses in these cases, it is unclear how these analyses may
be applied in the future.  Since the Court did not engage in equal protec-
tion analysis, it left open to the lower courts what standard of review
should be applied to cases involving classifications based upon sexual
orientation.  This trilogy of cases provides clues to how the Court may
approach sexual orientation matters in the future.  These clues are critical
at a time when the Court has essentially frozen which classifications may
receive heightened scrutiny under equal protection81 and limited the
rights that are subject to strict scrutiny analysis under substantive due
process.82
75 Sobel, supra note 20, at 498 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)). R
76 See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text. R
77 See Yoshino, supra note 54, at 760. R
78 Miranda Oshige McGowan, Lifting the Veil on Rigorous Rational Basis Scrutiny, 96
MARQ. L. REV. 377, 385 (2012).
79 See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 35, at 8. R
80 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).  This section does not discuss the Court’s
decision in Hollingsworth v. Perry because that decision was not decided on either substantive
due process or equal protection grounds. See 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013) (resolving on
standing).
81 See Yoshino, supra note 54, at 757. R
82 See Hunter, supra note 53, at 1108. R
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A. The Trilogy of Decisions
In 1996, the Court’s first case upholding the rights of sexual minori-
ties was handed down in Romer v. Evans.83  Part of Romer’s significance
was the sheer fact that it was a favorable decision for LGBT advocates in
a relatively short time after the Court decided that there was no right to
“homosexual sodomy” in Bowers v. Hardwick.84  Unlike the Bowers de-
cision, Romer did not involve issues related to sexual activity.  Instead,
Romer involved an amendment to the Colorado constitution repealing
local laws that prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion and prohibiting any future state or local legislative, judicial, or exec-
utive action protecting individuals on the basis of their sexual
orientation.85  Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, stated: “Homosex-
uals, by state decree, are put in a solitary class with respect to transac-
tions and relations in both the private and governmental spheres.  The
amendment withdraws from homosexuals, but no others, specific legal
protection from the injuries caused by discrimination, and it forbids rein-
statement of these laws and policies.”86
The decision further explained that the amendment placed a “broad
and undifferentiated disability on a single named group, an exceptional
and . . . invalid form of legislation.”87  Justice Kennedy concluded that
the amendment seemed “inexplicable by anything but animus toward the
class it affects” and that it lacked a rational relationship to legitimate
state interests.88  The decision, however, never addressed what standard
of review should be applied to the group affected by the amendment.  It
merely stated that the amendment could not meet the most minimal of
standards.
The decision is most notable for its animus-related analysis. Romer
found that “laws of the kind now before us raise the inevitable inference
that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of
persons affected.”89  The Romer Court then reiterated the proposition
that animus does not constitute a legitimate governmental interest.90  As
a result, the Court held that the amendment violated the Equal Protection
Clause.91  The Romer Court laid an important part of its new sexual ori-
83 517 U.S. at 632.
84 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
85 Romer, 517 U.S. at 624 (citing COLO. CONST. of 1876, art. II, § 30b (1992)).
86 Id. at 627.
87 Id. at 632.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 634.
90 See id. at 634–35 (“[I]f the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’
means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.” (quoting U.S. Dep’t of
Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973))).
91 See id. at 635.
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entation analytical foundation with its application of impermissible ani-
mus to the equal protection claim.
The next sexual orientation case came before the Court in 2003.92
This time it revisited sexual issues presented in Bowers.93  Unlike Bow-
ers, where the statute criminalized sodomy generally, Lawrence
presented both equal protection and due process claims because the
Texas sodomy statute solely criminalized same-sex sodomy.94  Justice
Kennedy, once again writing for the Court, stated that the decision
should not be based on equal protection grounds.  He reasoned that the
right at issue was protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty, and a
decision based on due process grounds advanced the equal protection
interests present as well.95  Even if same-sex sodomy prohibitions were
treated the same legally as opposite-sex sodomy, the stigma related to the
criminality would remain.96
The Lawrence Court quoted Justice Stevens’s Bowers dissent,
“‘[I]ndividual decisions by married persons, concerning the intimacies of
their physical relationship, even when not intended to produce offspring,
are a form of ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Moreover, this protection extends to intimate
choices by unmarried as well as married persons.’”97
Justice Kennedy also quoted Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey’s language related to personal liberty and added
that the liberty right under the Due Process Clause gives sexual minori-
ties the full right to engage in this conduct without intervention of the
government.98
The Court concluded that the Texas law did not further a legitimate
state interest99 but did not explicitly state whether the right at issue was a
privacy right or any other type of fundamental right.100 Lawrence, like
Romer, appears to put forth the idea that the statute could not survive
even the lowest standard of review, and as a result, it was unnecessary
92 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
93 See id. at 564.
94 See id. at 566.
95 See id. at 575.
96 See id.
97 Id. at 578 (emphasis added) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).  The emphasized language clarified that liberty interests were not
being tied to marital status.  No state recognized marriage equality for same-sex couples when
Lawrence was decided.
98 See id. at 578 (“‘It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal
liberty which the government may not enter.’” (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992))).
99 See id.
100 See Lisa K. Parshall, Redefining Due Process Analysis: Justice Anthony M. Kennedy
and the Concept of Emergent Rights, 69 ALB. L. REV. 237, 247 (2005).
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for the Court to articulate what standard of review should be applied in
“liberty” cases.  This case was still seen as an important victory.  The
Court’s purposeful decision to avoid a traditional equal protection analy-
sis, however, did not provide the tools necessary for courts to address
other types of sexual orientation discrimination.
In United States v. Windsor,101 the Court examined the constitution-
ality of section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA),102 which
limited federal recognition of marriages to one man and one woman.103
The Court found that DOMA unconstitutionally injured the class of
same-sex couples that New York law sought to protect by legally recog-
nizing their marriages.104  The Court then went on to quote Moreno, just
as the Romer Court did.105
The Court stated that since DOMA’s principal purpose and effect
were to demean lawfully married same-sex couples, it was an unconstitu-
tional deprivation of liberty under the Fifth Amendment.106  The decision
then linked the liberty interest protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause with the prohibition against denying to any person the
equal protection of the laws.107  It further explained that the equal protec-
tion guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment made the Fifth Amendment
rights at issue more specific and better understood and preserved.108
The Windsor Court concluded that section 3 of DOMA was invalid
because “no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to dis-
parage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought
to protect in personhood and dignity.”109  Once again, the Court took the
minimalist route, declaring that DOMA had no legitimate purpose while
101 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
102 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012) invalidated by Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675.
103 See id.  Only section 3 of DOMA was invalidated by Windsor. See 133 S. Ct. at
2682–83.  Section 2, DOMA’s full faith and credit provision permitting states to legally ignore
marriages of same-sex couples from other states, territories, possessions, or tribes, may face
litigation in the future. See Mark Strasser, Windsor, Federalism, and the Future of Marriage
Litigation, 37 HARV. J.L. & GENDER ONLINE 1, 1 (2013).
104 The Court stated that DOMA violated both equal protection and due process princi-
ples. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V; Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497 (1954)).  The Court also discussed at length how federalism impacted the case, see id. at
2691–92, but ostensibly did not base its ultimate holding on federalism. Cf. Ernest A. Young
& Erin C. Blondel, Federalism, Liberty, and Equality in United States v. Windsor, 2012–2013
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 117, 128. See generally Marc R. Poirier, “Whiffs of Federalism” in
United States v. Windsor: Power, Localism, and Kulturkampf, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 935
(2014).
105 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct at 2693 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528, 534–35 (1973)); supra note 90 and accompanying text. R
106 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695.
107 See id. (citing Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499–500 (1954); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena˜, 515 U.S. 200, 217–18 (1995)).
108 See id. at 2695.
109 Id. at 2696.
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failing to state the standard of analysis it applied.  This stands in contrast
to Windsor’s Second Circuit decision, which determined that classifica-
tions based on sexual orientation should apply heightened scrutiny.110
Despite its lack of traditional analysis, Windsor held that DOMA vio-
lated the Fifth Amendment.111
The Windsor decision mirrors Justice Kennedy’s Lawrence112 and
Romer113 opinions, which did not specifically state which standard of
review was being applied.  All three of the cases concluded that the gov-
ernment’s proffered justifications did not satisfy even the lowest level of
review, but did not indicate if that was the ultimate hurdle the govern-
ment was required to meet.
Justice Scalia’s Windsor dissent addresses this issue by pointing out
that the majority opinion “does not apply strict scrutiny” or “anything
that resembles” the deferential framework of rational basis review.114
Commentators have suggested that the test the Court applied in Windsor
was some form of heightened scrutiny,115 with similarities to Romer.116
At a minimum, these cases demonstrate that unlike traditional, deferen-
tial rational basis review, the Court will not automatically accept the gov-
ernment’s asserted bases at face value.117
Romer and Lawrence are the foundational cases for the Windsor
decision.  This is evidenced by Justice Kennedy’s references to those
cases as well as the vocabulary and concepts Windsor employs.118 Wind-
sor ties its analysis to Romer as an equal protection decision119 and Law-
110 See Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 185 (2d Cir. 2012).  The Court merely
restated the standard of review applied by the lower courts, but it did not discuss whether the
standard was correct. See 133 S. Ct. at 2684.  It can be argued that it implicitly accepted the
standard of review with an unqualified affirmation of the Second Circuit’s decision.
111 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695.
112 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
113 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
114 See 133 S. Ct. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320
(1993)).  Justice Scalia offers possible legitimate reasons why Congress could have validly
passed DOMA. See id. at 2708 (discussing choice-of-law issues relating to federal taxes).
115 See Randy Barnett, Federalism Marries Liberty in the DOMA Decision, SCOTUS-
BLOG (June 26, 2013, 3:37 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/federalism-marries-liber
ty-in-the-doma-decision/ (referring to Windsor’s requirement of “careful consideration”). But
see Helen J. Knowles, Taking Justice Kennedy Seriously: Why Windsor Was Decided “Quite
Apart from Principles of Federalism,” 20 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015)
(manuscript at 26), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2319487.
116 See Julie A. Nice, And Marriage Makes Three: A Gay Rights Trilogy Secures a Leg-
acy, HUFFINGTON POST (July 3, 2013, 4:27 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/julie-a-nice/
and-marriage-makes-three-_b_3537739.html.
117 See Levine, supra note 31, at 6 (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 631). R
118 Linda C. McClain, From Romer v. Evans to United States v. Windsor: Law as a
Vehicle for Moral Disapproval in Amendment 2 and the Defense of Marriage Act, 20 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL’Y 351, 467 (2013).
119 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 633).
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rence as a substantive due process decision.120  Neither Romer nor
Lawrence, however, applies traditional analysis such as identifying the
right at issue as being fundamental or applying a standard of review anal-
ysis.121 Windsor is even less clear in identifying which clause it utilized
in its analysis.  Nevertheless, Windsor relies on judicial analysis includ-
ing liberty interests and the role of animus to determine that the legal
provision  at issue was unconstitutional.122  Justice Scalia’s dissent in
Windsor points out that even though the majority decision failed to de-
clare whether they were applying substantive due process or not, that is
in fact what they were doing.123
The trilogy of cases demonstrates an evolution in the Court’s analy-
sis.  The next subsection looks more closely at each of the available anal-
yses’ strengths and limitations for sexual orientation-related litigation.
B. The Available Sexual Orientation Analyses
It appears that there are three constitutional analyses available to
litigants bringing claims on the basis of sexual orientation discrimination.
The first two are ones that the Court has utilized in the trilogy: the hybrid
liberty interest and impermissible animus.  The last, traditional equal pro-
tection analysis, has not been conducted by the Court for sexual orienta-
tion classifications.  This subsection of the Article examines how the
three analyses have been discussed by the Court and their relevance to
future sexual orientation-related cases.
1. Due Process/Equal Protection Hybrid Liberty Analysis
The Court has created a hybrid liberty interest analysis, which is a
melding of substantive due process and equal protection doctrines.124
This effort to bring the analysis together is not surprising given that
scholars often discuss the difficulty in separating due process from equal
protection analysis.125  The distinction, however, becomes almost irrele-
vant with the Court’s hybrid liberty interest analysis.  Professor Law-
120 See id. at 2692–93 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003)).
121 See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Larry and Lawrence, 42 TULSA L. REV. 843, 846 (2007);
Nice, supra note 116. R
122 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693, 2695.
123 See id. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  He further points out that the majority fails to
argue that same-sex marriage is “‘deeply rooted in this nation’s history and tradition,’” id. at
2706–07 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997)), or that DOMA
prevents “ordered liberty.” Id. at 2707 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937)). See also id. at 2715 (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that it is beyond dispute that the
right to same-sex marriage is not deeply rooted in history or tradition).
124 See Tribe, supra note 13, at 1897–98. R
125 See, e.g., Nancy C. Marcus, Deeply Rooted Principles of Equal Liberty, Not “Argle
Bargle”: The Inevitability of Marriage Equality After Windsor, 23 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 17,
25–26 (2014) (discussing the concept of “equal liberty”).
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rence Tribe has discussed how the analyses of the two constitutional
clauses are intertwined into a “legal double helix.”126  And this joining of
analyses, according to Tribe, creates a so-called theory of “substantive
liberty.”127  Professor Kenji Yoshino refers to these types of intertwined
cases as “‘dignity’ claims” and argues that this move towards the hybrid
analysis is due to the Court’s reluctance to use true group-based equal
protection analysis.128
In many ways, the trilogy of decisions reflects the judicial philoso-
phy that Justice Kennedy foreshadowed in his confirmation hearing
when he stated that he preferred to think of “privacy as being protected
by the liberty clause” of the Due Process Clause.129  During the hearing,
Justice Kennedy discussed the reach of the Due Process Clause by stat-
ing that:
[An] abbreviated list of the considerations are the essen-
tials of the right to human dignity, the injury to the per-
son, the harm to the person, the anguish to the person,
the inability of the person to manifest his or her person-
ality, the inability of a person to obtain his or her own
self-fulfillment, the inability of a person to reach his or
her potential.130
This response reflects the importance of the concept of liberty for
Justice Kennedy.  It can also be seen as an alternate route to privacy
analysis for some due process claims.  The Court’s privacy jurisprudence
has been much criticized by originalists and textualists131 since it was
first articulated in Poe v. Ullman.132  The analytical shift in Lawrence
towards the new hybrid liberty analysis can be interpreted as a movement
away from the Court’s privacy precedents and traditional due process
analysis of fundamental rights and “deeply rooted traditions.”133 Law-
rence’s reasoning is in large part based on privacy due process cases
such as Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.134
126 Tribe, supra note 13, at 1898. R
127 Id. (construing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)).
128 Yoshino, supra note 54, at 748–49. R
129 See Levine, supra note 31, at 12 n.83 (citing Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to be R
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 121 (1989)).
130 Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 180 (1989).
131 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW 95–100 (1990).
132 367 U.S. 497, 521 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).  The opinion also contains lan-
guage that serves as the foundation for substantive due process liberty jurisprudence. See id. at
542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
133 Crooks, supra note 15, at 228–29 (citations omitted). R
134 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573–77 (2003).
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Lawrence, however, recast the privacy right found in Griswold, Roe, and
other cases as a liberty interest.  The language Lawrence focuses on from
the “privacy” line of precedents is the text regarding liberty.135  In fact,
the Court never describes the right at issue as a “privacy” right, and
outside of a direct quote, the only reference to privacy occurred when it
discussed that Griswold used the word to describe the relevant liberty
interest in that case.136
The Lawrence decision also failed to engage in a substantive due
process analysis, to determine whether the right at issue is fundamental,
as it had with other rights before the Court.137  The Court’s most notable,
recent application of traditional due process analysis occurred in Wash-
ington v. Glucksberg,138 but the Lawrence Court ignored Glucksberg’s
bifurcation of fundamental rights and other liberty interests.139 Law-
rence did not engage in a rigid application of strict scrutiny or rational
basis review, but focused instead on the liberty interests at issue in the
Texas statute.140 Lawrence balanced Texas’s regulatory interests against
the liberty interests threatened by the Texas statute and concluded that
the “‘Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify
its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.’”141
Professor Cass Sunstein argues that the Court’s effort to assimilate
Lawrence with other fundamental right cases such as Griswold, Roe, Ca-
rey, and Casey suggests a fundamental right in the area of sex and repro-
duction.142  Professor Randy Barnett proposes that Justice Kennedy
employed a “presumption of liberty” analysis that requires the govern-
ment to justify its liberty restriction instead of the claimant proving that
the liberty at stake is “fundamental.”143  Regardless of the reason for the
departure, Lawrence points to the hybrid liberty analysis as a potential
replacement for traditional analysis.
The “liberty” that Lawrence spoke of was “as much about equal
dignity and respect” as it was about the freedom to act.144  The use of the
word dignity145 has received attention from scholars in relation to consti-
135 Id. at 573–74.
136 Hunter, supra note 53, at 1105–06 (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565). R
137 See Crooks, supra note 15, at 256. R
138 521 U.S. 702, 720–36 (1997).
139 E.g., Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts,
and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 96 (2003).
140 See id.
141 Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578).
142 See Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality,
and Marriage, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 27, 47.
143 Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas,
2002–2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21, 36.
144 Tribe, supra note 13, at 1898. R
145 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567, 574–75 (2003).
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tutional analysis on sexual orientation issues.  Professor Tiffany Graham
states that the Lawrence Court, in rejecting Bowers’s demeaning ap-
proach, “restored dignity to the class.”146  Professor Kenji Yoshino posits
that the Court will continue to utilize due process to vindicate equality
through “liberty-based dignity” claims.147
Lawrence justified expansive application of due process analysis by
stating that the framers were intentionally vague, leaving the interpreta-
tion of due process to future generations.148  Justice Kennedy also wrote
in Lawrence that the Court’s precedents “show an emerging awareness
that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how
to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”149 Lawrence,
however, appears to promote the hybrid nature of the case150 when Jus-
tice Kennedy stated, “Equality of treatment and the due process right to
demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of
liberty are linked in important respects, and a decision on the latter point
advances both interests.”151 As a result, Lawrence can be seen as a “uni-
versal liberty case about the right of all consenting adults to engage in
sexual intimacy in the privacy of their homes.”152
Windsor’s analysis is consistent with the sexual orientation liberty
language in prior cases.153  In Windsor, Justice Kennedy stated that the
federal Defense of Marriage Act “is unconstitutional as a deprivation of
the liberty of the person protected by the Fifth Amendment of the Consti-
tution.”154  Like Lawrence, Windsor does not mention privacy, but it
does discuss private relationships.155  Unlike Lawrence, however, Wind-
sor appears to be deciding the case on equal protection grounds or some
type of due process/equal protection hybrid analysis.
By relying on liberty instead of privacy, Justice Kennedy brought
the analysis back to the text of the Due Process Clause and avoided the
146 Tiffany C. Graham, The Shifting Doctrinal Face of Immutability, 19 VA. J. SOC.
POL’Y & L. 169, 202 (2011).
147 See Yoshino, supra note 54, at 748–50 (citing the fear of pluralism as the reason the R
Court has limited equal protection analysis to already protected groups).
148 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578–79; see also Yoshino, supra note 54, at 780 & n.228 R
(citing Stephen L. Carter, Constitutional Adjudication and the Indeterminate Text: A Prelimi-
nary Defense of an Imperfect Muddle, 94 YALE L.J. 821, 830, 854 (1985) (arguing that the
Constitution’s rights provisions are “abstract”)).
149 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572.
150 Cf. Ho, supra note 16, at 30–31 (citing Kim Forde-Mazrui, Tradition as Justification: R
The Case of Opposite-Sex Marriage, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 300–01 (2011)).
151 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575.
152 Yoshino, supra note 54, at 778. R
153 See generally Charles D. Kelso & Randall Kelso, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of
Justice Kennedy on Liberty, 9 DARTMOUTH L.J. 29 (2011) (discussing the development and
application of Justice Kennedy’s concept of constitutionally protected liberty).
154 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013).
155 See id. at 2692 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567).
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battles over the appropriateness of the privacy analysis.  The recasting of
the pertinent interest as a hybrid liberty interest created a new, more ex-
pansive legal analysis for substantive due process cases 156 that incorpo-
rated concepts of equality.
2. Equal Protection Animus Analysis
The Court’s reliance on the doctrine of unconstitutional animus has
become part of its equal protection analysis.157  The Court has not explic-
itly stated what constitutes animus,158 and its interpretations vary greatly.
Some see animus as more than hostility, while others view it as a desire
to harm or exclude.159  There are also differences of opinion related to
the impact of animus, which is demonstrated by evidence or inferred
from the structure or function of the law.  Some believe that animus in-
validates the law and others believe that it may be upheld if there is
another legitimate interest.160  The language in Windsor’s opinions dem-
onstrates how different Justices approach the animus concept.  Justice
Kennedy described animus as something similar to “unconscious bias as
opposed to malicious intent.”161  Justice Scalia interpreted animus as an
extreme or hateful mindset and then made the logical leap that the major-
ity decision was, in effect, accusing Congress of acting with “hateful
hearts” when it passed DOMA.162
Windsor followed the line of precedents where animus was the fea-
tured culprit behind the challenged law’s irrationality.163  The Windsor
Court cited to animus precedents that were not related to sexual orienta-
tion classifications. Windsor utilized language from Moreno in its analy-
sis when stating that the constitutional guarantee of equality “‘must at
the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically
unpopular group cannot’ justify disparate treatment of that group.”164
The Court found that DOMA was “invalid, for no legitimate purpose
156 See Gerken, supra note 121, at 846 (stating that the opinion wove the “zonal, deci- R
sional and relational” concepts of substantive due process into a single liberty interest (citing
Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1443–48 (1992))).
157 See, e.g., Pollvogt, supra note 19, at 205–06. R
158 See Carpenter, supra note 16, at 184–85 (discussing varied criticisms of anti-animus R
principle).
159 See Pollvogt, supra note 19, at 209. R
160 See id. at 209–10 (citations omitted).
161 Id. at 211 (citing United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013)).
162 Id. (quoting Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2707 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).  He further character-
ized animus as the mindset of “unhinged members of a wild-eyed lynch mob.” Windsor, 133
S. Ct. at 2707–08.  Chief Justice Roberts’s idea of animus required a “sinister motive” and
“bigotry.” Id. at 2696 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
163 See Ho, supra note 16, at 56 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996); R
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973)).
164 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534–35).
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overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom
the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect.”165
The Windsor Court explained that laws motivated by an improper
animus (“discriminations of an unusual character”) require careful con-
sideration.166  Some have suggested, however, that a finding of animus is
akin to a “silver bullet” that, once detected, eliminates any purported
legitimate justifications of the legislation.167  At a minimum, it can be
argued that rational basis with bite, as opposed to traditional rational ba-
sis, should be applied once animus is detected.168  Justice O’Connor also
presented this principle in her concurring opinion in Lawrence: “When a
law exhibits such a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, we have
applied a more searching form of rational basis to strike down such laws
under the Equal Protection Clause.”169
These cases demonstrate that when the Court has found legal ani-
mus against an unpopular group, it has applied a more searching form of
rational basis review,170 and in every case where courts have engaged in
rigorous rational basis analysis, “the added rigor has proved fatal to the
challenged law.”171  In the end, Windsor, like the animus cases before it,
concluded that DOMA could not survive under the animus principle.172
3. Traditional Equal Protection Analysis
The Court has never engaged in a standard of review analysis of
sexual orientation classifications, and Windsor is just the latest example
of the Court’s decades-long avoidance of classification analysis.173  Un-
like other classifications that the Court has said were not deserving of
heightened scrutiny such as wealth,174 intellectual disability,175 or age,176
the Court has never attempted a traditional equal protection analysis of
sexual orientation as a class.  In the sexual orientation trilogy cases, the
165 Id. at 2696. But cf. Pollvogt, supra note 19, at 213–14 (citing Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at R
2707 (Scalia, J., dissenting)) (discussing Justice Scalia’s view that one legitimate interest over-
comes impermissible animus).
166 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 633).
167 Pollvogt, supra note 19, at 213 (citing Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696); see also Carpen- R
ter, supra note 16, at 204 (citing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMAL- R
ISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 148 (2001) (referring to animus as a “trump card”)).
168 See Kenji Yoshino, Why the Court Can Strike Down Marriage Restrictions Under
Rational-Basis Review, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 331, 336 (2013).
169 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
170 See Pollvogt, supra note 19, at 208 (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580 (O’Connor, J., R
concurring in judgment)).
171 McGowan, supra note 78, at 385 (citations omitted). R
172 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693.
173 See Araiza, supra note 55, at 369 (citations omitted). R
174 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28–29 (1973).
175 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 445–46 (1985).
176 See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312–14 (1976) (per curiam).
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Court concluded that the governmental interests were not legitimate, and
consequently, the governmental restrictions did not satisfy rational basis
review.
Some observers have argued that if the Court engaged in equal pro-
tection analysis, it would determine that sexual orientation should receive
some form of heightened scrutiny due to the fact that LGBT people meet
the traditional criteria.177  Interestingly, the United States Attorney Gen-
eral informed Congress “the President had concluded that given a num-
ber of factors, including a documented history of discrimination,
classifications based on sexual orientation should be subject to a height-
ened standard of scrutiny.”178
It has been argued that Windsor is not a true equal protection deci-
sion because it does not engage in any type of classification analysis or
discussion regarding what standard of review should be applied.179  Ad-
ditionally, its use of animus does not have as in-depth of a review of the
equal protection implications as Romer.180  Moreover, it demonstrates
that equal protection can be applied more broadly than Justice
O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Lawrence by recognizing that the pos-
sibility of stigma is sufficient to invalidate a law.181 Windsor can be seen
as yet another incrementalist effort by the Court to further the rights of
LGBT people while reflecting social trends in the country.182
The Court’s animus precedents allowed the Court to focus on the
invidious reasons behind the legislation instead of sociological debates
about heightened scrutiny factors such as identity and immutability183 in
traditional equal protection analysis.  By focusing on animus, the Court
could ignore the immutability prong of equal protection analysis, which
has been the source of much discussion by scholars.184  The definition of
177 See, e.g., Nicholas Drew, A Rational Basis Review that Warrants Strict Scrutiny: The
First Circuit’s Equal Protection Analysis in Massachusetts v. U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, 54 B.C. L. REV. ELECTRONIC SUPPLEMENT 43, 52–53 (2013), available at
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol54/iss6/5.
178 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683 (quoting Letter from Eric H. Holder,
Attorney General, to Hon. John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives, Regard-
ing the Defense of Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
letter-attorney-general-congress-litigation-involving-defense-marriage-act).
179 See Crooks, supra note 15, at 272. R
180 See id. at 272–73 (citing Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692).
181 See Gerken, supra note 121, at 849 (stating that equal protection analysis does not R
need to be as “formal” or “cramped” as Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Lawrence
(citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579–85 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring))).
182 See Ho, supra note 16, at 55; see also Sobel, supra note 2 (citing Thomas M. Keck, R
Beyond Backlash: Assessing the Impact of Judicial Decisions on LGBT Rights, 43 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 151, 171 (2009)) (tracing incremental developments in state law).
183 See Ho, supra note 16, at 60. R
184 See Michael A. Helfand, The Usual Suspect Classifications: Criminals, Aliens and the
Future of Same-Sex Marriage, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 3 (2009).
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immutability has been the focus of a number of lower court decisions and
briefs,185 including whether a person’s sexual orientation is chosen; can
be changed; or is something a person should not be forced to change.186
An animus-based analysis also made a determination of political
powerlessness unnecessary,187 as well as dispensing with “whether [the]
asserted right is ‘deeply rooted in [the] Nation’s history and
tradition.’”188
There are many possible reasons these decisions do not formulai-
cally apply a standard of review analysis.  Perhaps Justice Kennedy felt
that classifications based on sexual orientation merited a higher standard
of review than rational basis but could not get the votes; believed it irrel-
evant what standard was applied because the legislation was based on
prejudice; or in keeping with the tenants of judicial economy, chose to
not extend the analysis because it was not necessary to the decision.189
Regardless of its reasons, the Court’s use of hybrid liberty interest and
animus analyses negates the requirement to determine whether a sexual
orientation classification should receive a heightened form of scrutiny190
or rational basis review191 because it is not necessary to the analysis.
And the Court avoids the arduous task of articulating why sexual orienta-
tion deserves a form of heightened scrutiny.192 Windsor is yet another
example of Justice Kennedy’s combining “judicial minimalism and
185 See, e.g., Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 655–58 (7th Cir. 2014); Whitewood v. Wolf,
992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 429 (M.D. Pa. 2014).
186 See Helfand, supra note 184, at 6 (citations omitted). R
187 See Robinson, supra note 12, at 1049–58 (discussing the role of political powerless- R
ness as a factor in suspect classifications and use of the issue by marriage equality advocates).
For those who believe in the concept of public choice, it could be argued that sexual minorities
are no longer powerless, and therefore, they are undeserving of “special rights,” such as non-
discrimination protections. See Bertrall L. Ross II, Democracy and Renewed Distrust: Equal
Protection and the Evolving Judicial Conception of Politics, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1565,
1624–25 (2013) (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 626, 636, 644 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
188 Eric Berger, Lawrence’s Stealth Constitutionalism and Same-Sex Marriage Litigation,
21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765, 775 (2013) (second alteration in original) (quoting Moore
v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
189 See id. at 771 (offering explanations for Justice Kennedy’s “stealth determinations” in
Lawrence); McClain, supra 118, at 476 (hypothesizing on reasons why no standard of review R
was stated in Windsor).
190 An equal protection analysis based upon sex discrimination has been offered as an
alternate route to heightened scrutiny. See, e.g., Catherine Jean Archibald, Two Wrongs Don’t
Make a Right: Implications of the Sex Discrimination Present in Same-Sex Marriage Exclu-
sions for the Next Supreme Court Same-Sex Marriage Case, 34 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1, 19–27
(2013); Koppelman, supra note 10, at 9–14. R
191 See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Remembering How to Do Equality, in THE
CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 93, 100 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009) (stating that
liberty analysis is attractive for advocates because courts do not have to define a class); Post,
supra note 139, at 100. R
192 See Ho, supra note 16, at 56–57 & n.321 (citing Toni M. Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick R
and Thin, 49 STAN. L. REV. 45, 76 (1996)) (“[J]udges might claim it is too difficult to pin
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avoidance, on the one hand, and, on the other, a robust (or more maxi-
malist) vision of equality and the status of equal citizenship.”193
The Court’s failure to state what level of review was being used in
the trilogy of cases, while summarily declaring laws invalid because the
government could not meet the lowest standard of review, has resulted in
criticism from advocates and scholars on both sides of the issue.194  For
example, Professor Eric Berger has stated that, with closer inspection,
“Lawrence turned on a series of under-theorized, stealth determinations.
It framed the question at a broad level of generality; relied on hybrid
reasoning, using equal protection rationales to support a due process
holding; declined to identify a level of scrutiny; and invoked changing
public opinion.” 195
This trilogy of cases has created legally unsatisfying decisions, and
with its most recent decision in Windsor, the Court may have signaled
the fatal demise of traditional equal protection jurisprudence.196  This
lack of guidance has also led to confusion regarding the appropriate stan-
dard of review to apply by other courts.197  Doctrinally, however, Law-
rence and Windsor have provided credible bases for the courts and
LGBT advocates to argue for continued use of a more stringent form of
scrutiny than traditional rational basis review of sexual orientation-based
classifications.198
Justice Scalia discussed how other courts would use Windsor’s anal-
ysis in the future and concluded, “How easy it is, indeed how inevitable,
to reach the same conclusion with regard to state laws denying same-sex
couples marital status.”199  Justice Scalia’s predictions related to how the
decision would be used have in fact transpired.  This Article’s next Part
examines how courts have approached the various constitutional analyses
prior to and after Windsor was handed down in 2013.
anything so concrete as ‘suspect class’ status on this murky, contextual, and poorly charted
human variation.”).
193 Cf. Michael J. Klarman, Windsor and Brown: Marriage Equality and Racial Equality,
127 HARV. L. REV. 127, 143–54 (2013) (discussing avoidance of substantive issues to avoid
backlash in Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013)).
194 See Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV.
431, 459 (2005) (citations omitted); Nelson Lund & John O. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas
and Judicial Hubris, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1578 (2004); McGowan, supra note 78, at 386. R
195 Berger, supra note 188, at 767. R
196 See Araiza, supra note 55, at 393. R
197 This problem is seen in other areas of constitutional jurisprudence, such as the Second
Amendment. See, e.g., Sobel, supra note 20, at 499. R
198 Cf. Douglas NeJaime, The Legal Mobilization Dilemma, 61 EMORY L.J. 663, 684
(2012).
199 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2709 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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III. STATE AND FEDERAL COURT STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Courts have not consistently applied a single level of review in fed-
eral Equal Protection or Due Process Clause cases regarding sexual ori-
entation classifications.  Tests include traditional rational basis review,
rational basis with bite, and heightened scrutiny.  The Supreme Court has
never addressed what level of review should be applied to cases alleging
constitutional violations on the basis of sexual orientation.  As a result,
decisions are inconsistent at best.  This Part reviews state and federal
lower court decisions prior to and post-Windsor and concludes that the
need for guidance from the Court has not been eliminated by the Windsor
decision.
A. Pre-Windsor Cases
Prior to 1996, most sexual orientation-related cases were decided in
light of the Court’s decision in Bowers v. Hardwick.200  The Bowers
Court did not address whether sexual orientation classifications com-
prised a suspect class under equal protection analysis but concluded that
there was no right to homosexual sodomy.201  Many courts throughout
the country relied on Bowers and state sodomy laws to limit the rights of
sexual minorities.202
A federal court of appeals addressed sexual orientation classifica-
tion discrimination for the first time in 1988. 203  The Ninth Circuit, in
Watkins v. United States Army, applied the heightened scrutiny factors to
determine whether sexual orientation deserved strict scrutiny analysis
under equal protection analysis.204  The Watkins Court held that “homo-
sexuals constitute such a suspect class.”205  The Watkins and Bowers de-
cisions did not necessarily conflict because they were addressing two
different constitutional claims.206
After Watkins, most federal and state courts still applied a deferen-
tial rational basis review to classifications involving sexual orienta-
tion,207 including cases within the Ninth Circuit.208  The most notable
exceptions were state courts concluding that state constitutional provi-
200 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
201 See id. at 190–91, 194.
202 See, e.g., Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 108 (Va. 1995) (holding that lesbian
conduct was a consideration in custody because it was punishable as a felony by state law).
203 See Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1345 (9th Cir. 1988).
204 Id. at 1345–49.
205 Id. at 1349.
206 See Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Rela-
tionship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1165 (1988).
207 See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 818
& n.16 (11th Cir. 2004).
208 See Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat’l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 1997); High
Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990).
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sions demanded heightened scrutiny.209  The first post-Watkins case to
apply strict scrutiny to a sexual orientation-related claim was Baehr v.
Lewin.210  The Hawaii Supreme Court had the task of deciding whether
the state unlawfully prohibited same-sex couples from being married
under the state constitution.211  The Baehr court did not consider the case
to be sexual orientation discrimination but held that the state’s marriage
laws discriminated against same-sex couples on the basis of sex and were
subject to strict scrutiny under the Hawaii Constitution.212  In 2008, the
first post-Watkins state supreme court ruled that classifications based on
sexual orientation should receive strict scrutiny analysis under the state
equal protection clause.213
Similarly, in Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, the Con-
necticut Supreme Court concluded that “sexual orientation meets all the
requirements of a quasi-suspect classification.”214  The Kerrigan court
then utilized a traditional intermediate standard of review test and de-
clared that Connecticut’s law prohibiting same-sex couples from mar-
rying was invalid under the state constitution.215  The Iowa Supreme
Court also determined that sexual orientation classifications were subject
to heightened scrutiny under the state’s constitution but declined to spec-
ify whether strict or intermediate scrutiny should be applied because the
state’s same-sex marriage prohibitions could not withstand intermediate
scrutiny.216  The Second Circuit examined four of the factors related to
heightened scrutiny in United States v. Windsor and concluded that:
[H]omosexuals compose a class that is subject to height-
ened scrutiny.  We further conclude that the class is
quasi-suspect (rather than suspect) based on the weight
of the factors and on analogy to the classifications recog-
nized as suspect and quasi-suspect.  While homosexuals
have been the target of significant and long-standing dis-
crimination in public and private spheres, this mistreat-
ment “is not sufficient to require ‘our most exacting
scrutiny.’”217
209 See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 441–44 (Cal. 2008).
210 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993).
211 See id. at 54.
212 See id. at 67.
213 See Edward Stein, Marriage or Liberation?: Reflections on Two Strategies in the
Struggle for Lesbian and Gay Rights and Relationship Recognition, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 567,
580 & n.71 (2009) (citing In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 401).
214 957 A.2d 407, 431–32 (Conn. 2008).
215 See id. at 476–81.
216 See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 896 (Iowa 2009).
217 United States v. Windsor, 699 F.3d 169, 185 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Trimble v. Gordon,
430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977), aff’d on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013)).
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On the other hand, significantly more courts pre-Windsor applied rational
basis review to sexual orientation classifications.218
Even though courts have applied the same heightened scrutiny fac-
tors to sexual orientation classifications, they have reached different re-
sults, particularly related to immutability and political powerlessness.
For example, in Andersen v. King County, the Washington Supreme
Court stated that the plaintiffs “must make a showing of immutability,”
and their failure to cite other authority or studies supporting the conclu-
sion that sexual orientation is immutable is one of the reasons the court
declined to apply strict scrutiny to the classification.219  The Andersen
court’s analysis noted that Lawrence did not address the classification
issue but invalidated the challenged law because it did not satisfy rational
basis review, a standard that would not apply to an inherently suspect
class.220
The Court of Appeals of Maryland also declared that sexual orienta-
tion should not be accorded strict scrutiny because it did not sufficiently
satisfy political powerlessness.221  The court found that:
While there is a history of purposeful unequal treatment
of gay and lesbian persons, and homosexual persons are
subject to unique disabilities not truly indicative of their
abilities to contribute to society, we shall not hold that
gay and lesbian persons are so politically powerless that
they constitute a suspect class.222
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts did not engage in any
type of analysis related to the appropriate standard of review, but de-
faulted to the concept that discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion cannot meet even the lowest rung of constitutional analysis under
rational basis review.223  A federal district court determined that strict
218 See, e.g., Davis v. Prison Health Servs., 679 F.3d 433, 438 (6th Cir. 2012); Johnson v.
Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 532 (5th Cir. 2004); Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 731–32 (4th Cir.
2002); Schroeder v. Hamilton Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 950–51 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that
rational basis analysis is appropriate for equal protection claim related to harassment on the
basis of sexual orientation); Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 458 (7th Cir. 1996); Zavatsky
v. Anderson, 130 F. Supp. 2d 349, 356 (D. Conn. 2001); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1,
11 (N.Y. 2006); Seymour v. Holcomb, 790 N.Y.S.2d 858, 863 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005).
219 Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 974, 976 (Wash. 2006).
220 See id. at 976.  Andersen states an opinion concerning the standard of review applied
in Lawrence v. Texas that is contrary to that of the Supreme Court.  In Lawrence, the Court
purposely utilized substantive due process in holding that the statute in question violated the
Constitution and avoided an equal protection analysis. See discussion supra Part II.A.  Justice
O’Connor, in a separate concurrence in judgment, expressed a belief that the majority should
have applied rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
221 See Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 609 (Md. 2007).
222 Id.
223 See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003).
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scrutiny should apply to sexual orientation but decided that the analysis
was unnecessary because the statute could not satisfy rational basis.224
Other cases relied on Supreme Court precedents, such as Romer v.
Evans225 and Lawrence v. Texas,226 that did not apply or discuss what
level of review should be used for sexual orientation classifications but
noted that a legitimate interest does not exist when a regulation is based
on animus or impermissibly intrudes into the personal and private life of
the individual.227  Courts also distinguished their cases from Romer or
Lawrence in order to reach different conclusions.228  The Court’s Wind-
sor decision has supplemented the analysis previously conducted by
lower courts.
B. Post-Windsor Cases
Most post-Windsor cases have struck down state laws and constitu-
tional amendments related to sexual orientation.  The courts, however,
have gone about it in a variety of ways, utilizing different legal theories
and applying them in different manners.  Since Windsor lacked defini-
tiveness in its analysis, some courts have even turned to Justice Scalia’s
account of what the majority did in Windsor.229  This section examines
what courts have done since Windsor.
As a threshold issue,230 courts address the applicability of Baker v.
Nelson, where the Court summarily dismissed an appeal from the Minne-
sota Supreme Court “for want of a substantial federal question.”231  Re-
cent court decisions have stated that summary decisions lose their
binding capacity if the Supreme Court no longer finds the issue unsub-
224 See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 997 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub
nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S.
Ct. 2652 (2013).
225 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
226 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
227 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578; Romer, 517 U.S. at 634–35; Massachusetts v. U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 14–15 (1st Cir. 2012); Kansas v. Limon, 122
P.3d 22, 38 (Kan. 2005).
228 See, e.g., Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 868 (8th Cir. 2006) (dif-
ferentiating state constitutional amendment limiting marital rights to opposite-sex couples
from broadness of the Colorado amendment in Romer); Equal. Found. v. City of Cincinnati,
128 F.3d 289, 295, 301 (6th Cir. 1997) (upholding the city charter amendment prohibiting
“special protection” for gays and lesbians by comparing its narrowness to the broadness of the
Colorado amendment in Romer).
229 See Poirier, supra note 104, at 994 & n.251 (citations omitted). R
230 This issue was not relevant in cases that were brought under state constitutional
provisions.
231 Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810, 810 (1972).  The Minnesota Supreme Court deemed
the statutory prohibition on same-sex marriage constitutionally valid. See Baker v. Nelson,
191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971).
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stantial232 and almost all courts addressing this issue since Windsor have
determined that Baker is no longer binding precedent.
Once courts have gotten beyond the threshold question regarding
Baker, they have engaged in a variety of analyses resulting in all three of
the traditional tiers of scrutiny being applied to determine similar issues.
Some post-Windsor courts have also relied on other constitutional justifi-
cations to invalidate laws, such as due process analysis of the fundamen-
tal right to marriage.
In Whitewood v. Wolf, the issue of the appropriate standard of re-
view for a sexual orientation classification was one of first impression in
the Third Circuit.233  The Whitewood court acknowledged that Windsor
provided little concrete guidance, but the court could apprehend in the
“tea leaves of Windsor” that the application of scrutiny was “more exact-
ing than deferential.”234  The court then engaged in an analysis of the
four heightened scrutiny factors: recent political and legal gains did not
negate the history of discrimination faced by gays and lesbians;235 sexual
orientation is not relevant to a person’s capabilities as a citizen; sexual
orientation is a distinguishing characteristic that is broader than immuta-
bility; and even though the political powerlessness factor was more
equivocal than the others, there are no statewide protections for gays and
lesbians.236  As a result, the court concluded that sexual orientation was a
quasi-suspect class that merited heightened scrutiny analysis.237
The Seventh Circuit, in Baskin v. Bogan, declined to engage in thor-
ough equal protection analysis and stated instead that “[t]he discrimina-
tion against same-sex couples is irrational, and therefore unconstitutional
even if the discrimination is not subjected to heightened scrutiny.”238
Other courts have utilized a rational basis standard of review, often
due to the fact that there was not sufficient, binding precedent to apply
any other standard.  This was the case in Geiger v. Kitzhaber, where the
district court stated that, while evolving, key Ninth Circuit precedent was
not binding.239  Regardless, the court held that there were no legitimate
interests to uphold Oregon’s same-sex marriage proscription under ra-
232 Compare Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 373 (4th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted)
(“Summary dismissals lose their binding force when ‘doctrinal developments’ illustrate that
the Supreme Court no longer views a question as unsubstantial.”), with DeBoer v. Snyder, 772
F.3d 388, 399–402 (6th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted) (“But this reading of ‘doctrinal develop-
ments’ would be a groundbreaking development of its own.”), cert. granted sub nom.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 83 U.S.L.W. 3315 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2015) (No. 14-571).
233 See Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 425 (M.D. Pa. 2014).
234 Id.
235 See id. at 428 (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685–86 (1973)).
236 See id. at 428–30.
237 See id. at 430.
238 766 F.3d 648, 656 (7th Cir. 2014).
239 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1140–41 (D. Or. 2014).
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tional basis analysis.240  An Idaho district court241 found to the contrary,
concluding that Ninth Circuit precedents required the court to apply
heightened scrutiny.242  Furthermore, Windsor supported a heightened
scrutiny analysis for sexual orientation classifications because the Su-
preme Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s use of heightened scrutiny in
the case.243  The court then held that the Idaho marriage law was uncon-
stitutional under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.244
Courts have also defaulted to rational basis after concluding that
there were no legitimate reasons for the sexual orientation discrimina-
tion.  In DeBoer v. Snyder, the Eastern District of Michigan stated that it
did not even have to address what level of scrutiny should be applied to
the classification because the Michigan constitutional amendment did not
survive rational basis.245  The court also concluded that it did not have to
bother with a fundamental rights analysis because the failure to meet
equal protection review made the due process analysis moot.246
Even though the Western District of Texas in De Leon v. Perry
conducted a traditional heightened scrutiny analysis and concluded that
the plaintiff’s arguments for heightened scrutiny were compelling, the
court held that it was unnecessary to apply heightened scrutiny because
the Texas prohibition at issue failed under the most deferential review.247
The court further held that the laws were unconstitutional infringements
of the fundamental right to marry, and after applying strict scrutiny, the
court stated that the government’s justifications were not rational, much
less compelling.248  In its conclusion, the De Leon court stated that
“[w]ithout a rational relation to a legitimate governmental purpose, state-
imposed inequality can find no refuge in our United States
Constitution.”249
Since Windsor, a few courts have upheld marriage-related provi-
sions that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.250  In DeBoer v.
Snyder, the Sixth Circuit became the only circuit to uphold a state’s mar-
ital limitation to opposite-sex couples.251  The Sixth Circuit stated that
240 See id. at 1148.
241 See Latta v. Otter, 19 F. Supp. 3d 1054 (D. Idaho 2014).
242 See id. at 1075–76.
243 See id. at 1076.
244 See id. at 1076–77.
245 973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 769 (E.D. Mich. 2014), rev’d, 772 F. 3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014).
246 See id. at 768.
247 See De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 650–52 (W.D. Tex. 2014).
248 See id. at 656–60.
249 Id. at 666.
250 See DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted sub nom.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 83 U.S.L.W. 3315 (Jan. 16, 2015) (No. 14-571); Robicheaux v. Cald-
well, 2 F. Supp. 3d 910, 927–28 (E.D. La. 2014); Borman v. Pyles-Borman, No. 2014-CV-36,
2014 WL 4251133 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Aug. 5, 2014).
251 772 F.3d at 399–402.
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the definition of marriage was limited to one man and one woman in
every state from the founding to 2003, and the Fourteenth Amendment
permitted this definition, but it did not require it.252  The court then held
that there were two rational governmental interests: regulating relation-
ships that result in procreation; and allowing states to wait and see before
changing the societal norm of marriage.253  The court further explained
that animus was not at issue in the Sixth Circuit states because the voter
initiatives merely codified a long-standing social norm that was already
reflected in state law.254 DeBoer also found no fundamental right to
marriage for same-sex couples255 and that it was not required to apply
heightened scrutiny analysis to the equal protection claims.256  In the
end, the court stated that the best way to address the issue was through
the political process.257
In Robicheaux v. Caldwell, the court relied on the fact that Windsor
did not mention heightened scrutiny.258  The court further stated that if
the Windsor “Court meant to apply heightened scrutiny, it would have
said so” and then Robicheaux distinguished its facts from Windsor.259
After analyzing the state’s justifications, the court reasoned that they sat-
isfied rational basis review because they were rationally related to the
government’s legitimate interests.260  The court further found that there
was no history or tradition of same-sex marriage, and consequently no
fundamental right was implicated by the state’s laws or constitution.261
Ultimately, the court found that the state’s provisions did not violate the
Constitution.262
Some courts have focused their decisions on the fundamental right
to marry instead of or in addition to equal protection classification analy-
ses.  The Fourth Circuit, in Bostic v. Schaefer,263 found that same-sex
couples were being deprived of the fundamental right to marry under the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, and the state did not meet the
252 Id. at 404.
253 See id. at 404–06.
254 Id. at 408.
255 Id. at 411–12.
256 Id. at 413–16.
257 Id. at 421.
258 2 F. Supp. 3d 910, 917 (E.D. La. 2014).
259 Id. at 920 (suggesting that Louisiana engaged in a statewide deliberative process, un-
like Congress in Windsor).
260 See id. at 919–20.  The purported governmental interests in the case were that the laws
serve a central state interest of linking children to an intact family formed by their biological
parents and safeguarding that fundamental social change, in this instance, is better cultivated
through democratic consensus.
261 See id. at 922–23.
262 See id. at 928.
263 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014).
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strict scrutiny standard necessary for the fundamental rights analysis.264
Similar reasoning was used by the Tenth Circuit, in Kitchen v. Her-
bert,265 where the court quoted Lawrence’s language regarding every
generation invoking its principles in the search for greater freedom.266
The court then stated that “‘it is not the Constitution that has changed,
but the knowledge of what it means to be gay or lesbian.’”267
Similarly, in addition to the equal protection issues addressed in
Whitewood,268 the court addressed whether same-sex couples were being
deprived of their fundamental right to marry under the Due Process
Clause.269  The Whitewood court stated that the right the plaintiffs sought
was not a new right, but a right that had always existed—the right to
marry.270  The court held that the Pennsylvania statute was unconstitu-
tional under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.271  The deci-
sion closed by stating, “[I]n future generations the label same-sex
marriage will be abandoned, to be replaced simply by marriage.  We are
a better people than what these laws represent, and it is time to discard
them into the ash heap of history.”272
Other courts,273 such as the Ohio district court, have also focused
their decisions related to marriage equality on the fundamental right to
marry under due process and equal protection and declared a state law
invalid.274  The Obergefell court engaged in fundamental rights height-
ened scrutiny factor analyses and concluded that heightened scrutiny
should be applied, but concluded the death certificate law at issue would
not succeed even under rational basis analysis.275  In Brenner v. Scott,
another district court found that Florida violated the fundamental right to
marry under due process and equal protection analyses.276
264 See id. at 375–76, 384.
265 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014).
266 Id. at 1218 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003)); see also Bishop v.
Smith, 760 F.3d 1070, 1075, 1079–82 (10th Cir. 2014) (relying on the Kitchen analysis to
invalidate the Oklahoma constitutional amendment limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples).
267 Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1218 (quoting Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1203
(D. Utah 2013)).
268 See supra notes 233–37 and accompanying text. R
269 See Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 421–24 (M.D. Pa. 2014).
270 See id. at 423.
271 See id. at 431.
272 Id.
273 See, e.g., Brenner v. Scott, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (N.D. Fla. 2014); Obergefell v.
Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968 (S.D. Ohio 2013), rev’d sub nom. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d
388 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted sub nom. Obergefell v. Hodges, 83 U.S.L.W. 3315 (Jan. 16,
2015) (No. 14-571).
274 See Obergefell, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 982, 991 (using intermediate scrutiny to analyze the
fundamental right to marry and using heightened scrutiny for equal protection analysis).
275 See id. at 991.
276 999 F. Supp. 2d at 1281–82.
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One post-Windsor case that has received significant attention and
does not relate to marital rights is SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott
Laboratories.277  This case was originally filed due to a Batson challenge
to a peremptory strike of a self-identified gay prospective juror.278  The
court examined the case in light of their earlier Witt decision and Wind-
sor, and concluded it was required to apply heightened scrutiny to sexual
orientation classifications for equal protection purposes.279  Moreover,
Lawrence demanded the same conclusion for due process analysis.280
The court then held “that heightened scrutiny applies to classifications
based on sexual orientation and that Batson applies to strikes on that
basis.”281  The SmithKline case has been criticized as “an aggressive and
incomplete reading of Windsor” because the case did not discuss any
traditional standard of review or require “that the means be ‘closely’ or
‘necessarily’ tailored to the objective.”282
Since Windsor, lower courts have been grappling with issues related
to sexual orientation and they have demonstrated a striking lack of con-
sistency.  While most of the cases involved marital rights, it is not a big,
logical leap to conclude that courts faced with other sexual orientation
discrimination issues are also likely to apply vastly different tests that
could result in different case outcomes.  The next Part discusses why
traditional equal protection review is still necessary and how the Court
should approach equal protection analysis for sexual orientation-based
classifications.
IV. THE ROLE OF EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
IN FUTURE LITIGATION
Part III of this Article demonstrated how inconsistently courts are
applying constitutional jurisprudence to sexual orientation-related cases.
This Part will identify the gap in the Court’s analysis, outline traditional
equal protection review for future litigation, and explain why it is neces-
sary despite the many recent marriage equality victories.  Even though
discrimination may occur in countless contexts, section A primarily fo-
cuses on employment discrimination to illustrate the impact of equal pro-
tection analysis.  The Article will then address how equal protection
analysis should evolve—with the Court clarifying that heightened scru-
tiny is the appropriate standard of review for sexual orientation
classifications.
277 740 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2014).
278 See id. at 474 (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)).
279 See id. at 479–81 (citing Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2008)).
280 See id. at 484 (citing Witt, 527 F.3d at 816, 821).
281 Id. at 489.
282 Carpenter, supra note 16, at 202. R
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A. Discrimination Beyond Marriage
As seen in Part III of this Article, most of the recent litigation re-
lated to sexual orientation issues has been focused on marital rights.
These rights are of critical importance to same-sex families, but court
decisions in this legal area have limited impact on other substantive dis-
crimination claims for sexual minorities.  For example, Equality Advo-
cates Pennsylvania’s legal department was contacted by hundreds of
LGBT individuals each year for legal assistance.  The caller’s sexual ori-
entation or gender identity played a role in more than thirty legal issues
such as advanced planning, discrimination in shelters, name changes, and
custody matters.283  While family-related issues comprised a significant
number of requests for assistance, the single largest request for help was
employment-related discrimination.284
Those nonmarital calls for legal aid are just one example of the need
for the Court to clarify the equal protection analysis for sexual orienta-
tion classifications.285  Unlike race and gender, there are no federal laws
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and a ma-
jority of states still lack anti-discrimination protections for sexual minori-
ties.  As a result, clarification of the proper equal protection standard of
review, if it is higher than traditional rational basis, would provide
greater protection for sexual minorities who bring government-related
discrimination claims.286  At a time when many criticize the Court’s
seemingly weakened application of equal protection analysis in cases in-
volving race and gender,287 it is important to remember that the Equal
Protection Clause is not quite dead yet and could still assist those facing
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
There will be sexual orientation discrimination claims brought by
government employees or job applicants in the future.  In Dawkins v.
Richmond County Schools, the district court determined that the proper
283 The author was the executive director of Equality Advocates Pennsylvania, formerly
the Center for Lesbian and Gay Civil Rights, from 2001–2008.  The organization was the only
one in the country dedicated to advocating equality for LGBT people through direct legal
services, legislation, and education.
284 Interview with Katie R. Eyer, Assistant Professor, Rutgers Sch. of Law—Camden and
former Skadden Fellow and Emp’t Project Attorney with Equal. Advocates Pa. (Sept. 10,
2014).
285 Some scholars criticize the limited way in which the Court applies the liberty interest
to “domesticated” relationships and does not recognize a wider sexual privacy right related to
sexual orientation or other non-marital relationships. See generally Katherine M. Franke,
Commentary, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399
(2004).
286 See, e.g., Ho, supra note 16, at 65. R
287 See, e.g., Ian Haney-Lo´pez, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779 (2012);
Robinson, supra note 12, at 1062–63; see also Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 67 R
STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (raising the issue of how the Court may address “second
generation” discrimination claims related to efforts to remedy past discrimination).
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§ 1983 equal protection analysis was rational basis288 and a Title VII
claim could not be brought because it did not cover sexual orientation
discrimination.289  Similar issues were addressed in Hutchinson v.
Cuyahoga County Board of County Commissioners, where the court held
that the plaintiff’s claims of failure to hire or promote her to a number of
positions were actionable, subject to rational basis, as an equal protection
claim under § 1983.290  These cases demonstrate that courts will con-
tinue to hear a variety of sexual orientation-related equal protection
claims that are legally unrelated to the marriage equality issues currently
before the courts.
B. Equal Protection in the Future
The employment cases discussed above are relatively recent.  Those
courts did not engage in any traditional equal protection analysis to de-
termine whether sexual orientation-based discrimination claims should
be analyzed under heightened scrutiny.  This stands in contrast to much
of the recent marriage-related litigation covered in Part III of this Article.
The increased use of the four factors in support of heightened scru-
tiny analysis may reflect a trend in greater acceptance of LGBT people
and issues.  Some scholars have posited that the first two prongs, a his-
tory of discrimination and ability to contribute, are easily met, while the
immutability (to a lesser extent) and political powerlessness prongs are
still at issue.291  Several court decisions have reframed the immutability
discussion from a trait that a person cannot change to one that is such a
core part of a person’s identity that they should not be required to change
in order to comply with the law.292  This reframing effectively renders
the immutability question irrelevant as it relates to sexual orientation.
Similarly, it has been argued that political powerlessness analysis is not
relevant once a court has concluded that a classification is likely based
on prejudice, and the fact that more political power is attained over time
does not mean that prejudice and stereotypes have disappeared.293
288 No. 1:12CV414, 2012 WL 1580455, at *4–5 (M.D.N.C. May 4, 2012) (citing Goulart
v. Meadows, 345 F.3d 239, 260 (4th Cir. 2003)).
289 Id. at *4.
290 No. 1:08–CV–2966, 2011 WL 1563874, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 25, 2011).
291 See, e.g., Berger, supra note 188, at 796. R
292 See Graham, supra note 146, at 173 (citing Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 893 R
(Iowa 2009)).  Other scholars have also called into question the use of immutability for sexual
orientation classifications. See generally Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics
of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503 (1994); Kenji
Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 108 YALE L.J. 485 (1998).
293 See Chai R. Feldblum, Sexual Orientation, Morality, and the Law: Devlin Revisited,
57 U. PITT. L. REV. 237, 268–69 (1996).
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A number of the cases in Part III that applied the four-factor analy-
sis found that some sort of heightened scrutiny was warranted for sexual
orientation classifications.294  This trend is likely to continue, but there
will still be courts that will use traditional rational basis until the Su-
preme Court directs them to do otherwise.295  And the Court’s apparent
shift away from traditional equal protection to some sort of hybrid liberty
interest or animus analysis will not provide full legal coverage for the
LGBT community.296
If the Court continues to pursue the liberty interest analysis instead
of utilizing equal protection review, it will force LGBT people to gain
their rights in a piecemeal fashion by “litigat[ing] pieces of their human-
ity, one by one.”297  Equal protection offers “a potential constitutional
jackpot at the wholesale level” for the sexual orientation classification.298
It could be used to litigate sexual orientation discrimination claims re-
lated to any government activity without waiting for the Court to recog-
nize a liberty interest in the right first.  This type of formal equality not
only brings protections, but it also brings the possibility of deterrence
and shifts the debate in a way that the liberty analysis cannot.299
Since Lawrence and Windsor are liberty-related cases, they high-
light the right at issue belongs to all people, not just the group contesting
the discrimination.300  The Court is not likely to engage in these types of
broad hybrid liberty interest analyses in the future.  Additionally, many
instances of discrimination will not contain the type of evidence needed
to evoke an impermissible animus analysis.  The best approach entails
the Court deciding an Equal Protection Clause case that provides a spe-
cific standard of review for sexual orientation discrimination and ex-
plains how it reached its decision.
A future Supreme Court ruling that sexual orientation classifications
merit heightened scrutiny under traditional equal protection analysis
would not be breaking new ground, but would be more of a restatement
or a different application of what the Court has already been doing in
294 See, e.g., Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 428–30 (M.D. Pa. 2014).
295 See, e.g., Robicheaux v. Caldwell, 2 F. Supp. 3d 910, 917 (E.D. La. 2014).
296 See Yoshino, supra note 54, at 749–50, 797–802. R
297 Gerken, supra note 121, at 851.  Under this approach, just like the Court recognized a R
much broader right than the right to same-sex sodomy in Lawrence, the Court would need to
make multiple broad decisions to effectively cover most legal issues where sexual orientation
discrimination claims could be brought in the future.  For example, the Court could recognize
a broad right to education that would cover sexual orientation-related discrimination cases as
well as claims by other classifications.
298 Yoshino, supra note 54, at 799 (quoting William N. Eskridge, Jr., Destabilizing Due R
Process and Evolutive Equal Protection, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1183, 1216 (2000)).
299 See Katie R. Eyer, Marriage This Term: On Liberty and the “New Equal Protection,”
60 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 2, 14 (2012).
300 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003); Yoshino, supra note 54, at 778. R
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sexual orientation-related cases.  A declaration of heightened scrutiny
would also be in keeping with the growing number of federal and state
courts that have undergone the four-factor analysis and concluded that
sexual orientation is a classification warranting heightened scrutiny.
While the Windsor Court may have not specifically stated that it
was applying heightened scrutiny, its language and results confirm that
this is what the Court was in fact doing.  Whether it is the Court’s hybrid
liberty interest or impermissible animus analysis that is being applied,
the Court has not applied rational basis to any sexual orientation case
since Bowers.  The Court now needs to merely connect the equal protec-
tion analysis to its trilogy of decisions, which have already recognized
the social wrongs related to sexual orientation discrimination and applied
heightened scrutiny.  By clarifying that heightened scrutiny should be
applied as part of traditional equal protection analysis of sexual orienta-
tion-based discrimination claims, the Court will provide other courts with
a tool that they can use to remediate either broad or more individualized
governmental discrimination.
It is no longer good enough for courts, including the Supreme
Court, to state that no legitimate interest exists to avoid the exercise of
discussing what standard to use.  As demonstrated in Part III, until the
Court decides this issue, courts will inconsistently apply equal protection
standards of review.  Since traditional rational basis is so fatal to a claim,
it is imperative that the Court clarify that this is not the standard to be
applied to sexual orientation classifications.  Until it does so, the rights of
individual claimants will be determined almost automatically by the stan-
dard of review in their jurisdiction.  Finally, naming a heightened stan-
dard of review will provide fairness, predictability, and protection for
lesbian, gay, and bisexual people.
CONCLUSION
Many people, including scholars, in this country have been focused
on sexual orientation issues related to marriage equality for the last few
years.  This fascination is understandable because of the media attention,
legislation, ballot initiatives, and court cases on the topic.301  It is much
more difficult, however, to find coverage on other types of legal issues
facing LGBT people such as employment, housing, or education
discrimination.
Some people wrongly believe that most of the sexual orientation
problems will be resolved if same-sex couples are granted marriage
301 See generally Sobel, supra note 2. R
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equality.302  Victories in cases such as Windsor give hope to LGBT peo-
ple and their allies.  These victories are meaningful, but there is still an
incomplete legal roadmap for courts to follow for sexual orientation
discrimination.
The rights gained with marriage lose some of their importance if a
supervisor can legally fire an employee who applies for health benefits
for his or her new same-sex spouse.  The Court has already indicated
what it is doing through its hybrid liberty and impermissible animus
analyses.  Now it is time to clarify that heightened scrutiny should be
applied to sexual orientation discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause.
302 See Robinson, supra note 12, at 1071 (quoting ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NOR- R
MAL 185 (1995) (stating that ninety percent of the political work necessary to achieve gay
equality would be achieved by legalizing gay marriage)).
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